Larum Polskie Polska powstan jak jancuch dzwoni

Larum Polskie Polska powstan jak jancuch dzwoni

Poland and Georgia W rogatywce i tygrysiej skórze - Gruzini w AK 1917-1968 wrogatywce i tygrysiej skórze - Gruzini w AK (2007)

Poland and Georgia W rogatywce i tygrysiej skórze - Gruzini w AK 1917-1968 wrogatywce i tygrysiej skórze - Gruzini w AK (2007)

janek533 Przepiękna pieśń, jak również cała historia związana z tym dlaczego Lech Kaczyński został bohaterem Gruzji. Dziękujemy wam Gruzini
Very beautifull song so as the whole history why Lech Kaczyński become the hero of Georgia. I`m very greatfull for Georgia 1 day ago TheGeorgian29 Rest in peace Lech, u were really our friend and Hero :) We love you ... 1 day ago woodYates Thanks comrades. 3 days ago szampon Moments like that make me want to be with you, our Georgian brothers and sisters. If only us, the Poles, could commemorate him as beautifully. I write these words with tears in my eyes, mourning for President, thanking you and fearing for my beloved Poland.
We have fallen on really hard times, but we shall prevail. We shall be free.
Bog, Honor, Ojczyzna.
3 days ago okoRa100 Piękne. Pozdrowienia z Podhala, dzięki
6 days ago jooker43 Thank You !!! 1 week ago AnnaE28 Chwała i cześć! 2 1 week ago slawomirstella Dzięki Wam Gruzini 2 1 week ago ozznera Georgians will never forget Kaczynski, rest in peace Lech and Maria, god bless to your souls.


gruzińskich, którzy znaleźli się w szeregach Armii Krajowej w czasie II wojny światowej. Obecnie żyją w różnych krajach świata. W Polsce ma nastąpić odsłonięcie ich pomnika na terenie Muzeum Powstania Warszawskiego. http://www.filmpolski.pl/fp/index.php/4222697

president of Poland supporting Georgia

Georgian Folk song dedicated to the memory of Lech Kaczyński and his wife Maria

W rogatywce i tygrysiej skórze – film dokumentalny – TV Polonia …Losy gruzińskich oficerów, którzy w czasie II wojny światowej znaleźli się w AK. W Muzeum Powstania Warszawskiego ma powstać ich pomnik.

Originally Published in Georgia Today Newspaper

Last week, Georgia Today learned about a unique work that Jerzy Lubach, a renowned Polish documentary director, friend of Georgia and expert of the Caucasus had taken over. This is a documentary about Georgian officers who fought in the Polish army against the fascist and communist invaders. In the interview, Lubach disclosed a touching story of a Georgian noble diaspora having left a glorious trace in Polish history. Jerzy Lubach, along with his Georgian colleagues, discovered many interesting facts in the recently opened archives of Poland, Georgia and Russia. Since it sounds so interesting, we decided to narrate a bit about the basic story that laid the ground to the idea for the film. First of all, how did Georgian officers find themselves in Poland? Jerzy Lubach willingly answered this and other questions.
Jerzy Lubach

When Georgia gained independence from the Russian Empire, Georgia and Poland launched extensive diplomatic, political and military exchanges। The Polish state envoy, Waclaw Ostrowski, was dispatched to Georgia to set up a Polish diplomatic mission in the fledgling democratic republic. Poland firmly adhered to the policy of establishing close diplomatic relations with the states of the South Caucasus, which had escaped the shadow of Russian rule. Marshal and leader of Poland, Jozef Pilsudski, attached great importance to that strategy. Soon Georgia became a pivotal state as the way to Azerbaijan was cut off because of Bolshevic upheaval there. However, all the plans of fast development of Polish-Georgian relations collapsed with intrusion of the Soviet Red Army in independent Georgia on February 1921. After two weeks of merciless fighting, the tiny Georgian corps was crushed and the Soviet flag was raised in Tbilisi. The state was annexed, and the remainder of the leading Georgian military personnel as well as the temporary government fled to Europe via Batumi and Constantinople. Poland did not recognize the annexation of Georgia and kept close relations with the Georgian political and military authorities in exile. Moreover, in autumn 1921 Marshal Pilsudski’s military attaché in Constantinople, Colonel Babicki, addressed an offer to the chief of the Georgian military headquarters, General Alexander Zakariadze, that Poland was willing to accept Georgian officers in the Polish army. Georgian officers – six generals among them – came to Poland and it was to become their second motherland. According to historical data, they quickly grasped the specifics of the Polish military, perfected their Polish and established close relations with their Polish colleagues. “Although Germany announced free passage from Poland for any foreigners, none of the Georgian officer left the country in September 1939, when the fascist army invaded Polish lands. They heroically battled against the fascist occupants as well as Stalin’s Soviet army,” stressed Jerzy Lubach. Some Georgian officers held high military positions in the Polish army. Colonel Valerian Tevzadze led the northern defense of Warsaw. He later was awarded with the Silver Cross for Military Valor. After the Red Army took over Poland, Valerian Tevzadze joined the Polish underground against the communists until his death 1987. “Many Poles knew about Tevzadze who was just a ‘tidbit’ for both Soviet and Polish KGB, but no one gave him in,” underlined the film director in his talk with Georgia Today. As we learned, the current defense minister of Georgia, David Tevzadze, is a close descendent of Valerian Tevzadze. The minister pledged support to the film crew. “There are many other figures from the ranks of Georgian officers who gained fame in the battle for Poland,” Jerzy Lubach narrated. Major Artemi Aronishidze led the 360th infantry battalion in the defense of Warsaw. “He did not retreat until the surrender of the capital to the fascists.” Aronishidze was soon captured by the Germans, and later handed over to the Soviet KGB. Overall amnesty saved him from capital punishment. The major, who was also awarded the Silver Cross, died at 58, in 1950. Giorgi Tumanishvili was born in Poland, to a family of a Georgian officer in exile. In his youth he joined the Polish army in 1939 and had time for taking part in a number of Polish military campaigns against the fascists. Having gained the rank of captain, he was twice awarded with the Silver Cross for Military Valor. Dimitri Shalikashvili gained the rank of major in Poland. After the fall of Warsaw he escaped to America where his sons managed to reach the highest military positions. John Malkhaz Shalikashvili, the eldest son, was the chief of the united military headquarters of the U.S. for years in the early 90s. The younger brother is now taking active part in the Train and Equip Program conducted by the U.S. government in Georgia. “But, such success stories are very rare. A number of Georgian officers fighting in the Polish army died in Gestapo dungeons or Soviet camps,” the film director sighed. Thus, it is obvious that Jerzy Lubach has got a lot to say about the history of the military fraternity between the two nations. Tamara Dularidze, a lecturer at a Moscow cinematography institute and friend of the Polish director is working along with him. Dularidze and Lubach have a good experience in working together on Georgian-Polish history. The film “Seeking the White Angel”, about Grigol Peradze, a Georgian priest and scientist working in Poland, having been killed by the fascists for treating Polish Jews, deserved a high honor. The documentary about Georgian officers in Poland is to be shot in Georgia, Poland, Great Britain and Russia. The Georgian film studio Grifon Film Productions, under Irakli Metreveli, expressed its willingness to work in partnership with Jerzy Lubach on the film. “I hope to invite John Malkhaz Shalikashvili to work in Warsaw as well,” Jerzy Lubach told Georgia Today. The director is going to re-scrutinize the archive of the first Georgian republic of 1918-1921, which should provide a great deal of material for the film.
Georgian emigration in Poland
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The documented ties between Georgia and Poland reach back to the XV century, when the Georgian (Kartlian) King Konstantin sent a diplomatic mission to the Polish King Alexander Jagellon. Later, Polish King Jan III Sobiesky tried to establish contacts with Georgia. Many Georgians participated in military campaigns led by Poland in XVII century. Bohdan Grudziecki, a Georgian, was the greatest authority on all things Persian working in the Polish king’s diplomatic service, made frequent diplomatic trips to Persia, on which he obtained, among other things, guarantees upholding earlier privileges for missionaries. Already during the rule of King Jan Kazimierz was he sent on missions to Isfahan, and King Jan III Sobieski availed himself of Gurdziecki’s talents in like manner (in 1668, 1671, 1676-1678, in 1682-1684, and in 1687). Gurdziecki remained at the court of the shah for several years in the capacity of special resident and representative of the Polish king; it was him who delivered to the shah Suleiman news about the victory of the Christian forces at Vienna (1683).
Several Georgian politicians, intellectuals and military officers left Georgia for Poland after the Soviet armies invaded the Democratic Republic of Georgia (DRG) in February 1921, taking over the government and establishing the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic in the same March. Although not very numerous and consisting of a few hundred members, the Georgian community of Poland was very active politically and culturally. The best remembered are, however, the Georgian military personnel who served in the Polish ranks from the early 1920s until the end of the World War II.

[edit] Georgian Prometheism
Active diplomatic contacts developed between the short-lived DRG and Poland was part of Józef Piłsudski’s well-known political concept known as Prometheism. Its aim was to greatly reduce the power of Tsarist Russia and subsequently, the Soviet Union, by supporting nationalist independence movements of the major non-Russian peoples that lived within the borders of Russia or the Soviet Union.

Polish and Georgian officers serving in the Polish Army, 1925
The Georgian Promethean groups were one of the most active within the movement. This was not overlooked by the Bolsheviks, who in 1930 organized the assassination of Noe Ramishvili, a prominent Georgian political leader and a major promoter of Prometheism.
The 1932 Polish-Soviet mutual nonaggression pact precipitated the downfall of the Promethean movement though the Georgians continued their activities in various cultural and social organizations. The most important was the Committee of Georgia founded as early as 1921 by several Georgian intellectuals led by Sergo Qurulashvili. They had close contacts with the centers of Georgian political emigration across Europe, primarily in Paris. The Committee organized various meetings and social activities and provided material support for the Georgian émigrés. It also published its own publications, ProGeorgia (1922), and Propartia (1923). From 1923 to 1924, Qurulashvili also directed the journal Schlos Wschodu pertaining to the Georgian problems. The Georgians organized also the Union of Georgian Students and the Polish-Georgian Society led by Prince Pavle Tumanishvili. The activities of these organizations were limited, however, due to financial difficulties.

[edit] Georgians in the Polish military service

Major Giorgi Mamaladze, later murdered in the 1940 Katyn massacre
Immediately after the fall of the DRG, Noe Zhordania, the head of the Georgian government-in-exile, addressed the friendly nations, particularly France, Greece and Poland, to help in maintaining the professional military cadres. The government of Poland promptly responded, and from 1922 to 1924, hundreds of Georgian Junkers and officers, recommended by Zhordania’s government, were accepted in the Polish military schools. Several professional officers of the former DRG attended military training courses at the Polish army centers. Although not obligated to do so, virtually all of them were subsequently enrolled in the Polish army as contract officers. In the subsequent decade, the total number of Georgian military servicemen reached 1,000.
At the outbreak of the World War II, most of the Georgian officers took part in the 1939 Defensive War, and several of them commanded their own regiments composed of Polish soldiers. The most notable officers were:
Zakaria Bakradze, generał dywizji, deputy commander of Polish 15th Infantry Division.
Aleksandre Chkheidze, generał brygady, deputy commander of Polish 16th Infantry Division.
Ivane Kazbegi, generał brygady.
Aleksandre Koniashvili, generał brygady.
Kirile Kutateladze, generał brygady.
Aleksandre Zakariadze, generał brygady.
Viktor Lomidze, the commander of ORP Gryf.
Giorgi Tumanishvili, captain of the navy, who was awarded Virtuti Militari.
Valerian Tevzadze, podpułkownik, the commander of the northern sector of the Polish defences during the siege of Warsaw.
Mikheil Kvaliashvili, major, the commander of a cavalry battalion within the 15th Uhlans Regiment.
Several Georgian officers were captured by the Soviet forces during the 1939 campaign. General Chkheidze, Major Mamaladze, Captain Skhirtladze and Captain Rusiashvili were killed during the infamous Katyn Massacre, from 1940 to 1941. Many others spent several years in the gulag camps.

St. Grigol Peradze
During the occupation of Poland, the Germans reorganized the Warsaw-based Committee of Georgia and placed it under their tight control. The occupation administration encouraged the Georgian soldiers in the Polish service to join the Georgian Legion of the Wehrmacht. Some of them responded to the Nazi request, but subsequently joined the Polish resistance movement. The notable Georgian Orthodox priest and Professor Grigol Peradze of Warsaw University ended his life in the Auschwitz concentration camp (1942), when he deliberately entered a gas-chamber instead of a Jewish prisoner who had a large family.
John Malchase David Shalikashvili, general of the United States Army who served as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1993 to 1997, was born in Warsaw, Poland where his father also served in the army.
After the war, most Georgians either left for Western Europe or were deported to the Soviet camps though some of them (e.g., General V. Tevzadze) remained in the Polish anti-Communist underground for several decades.
Tribute to Polish President Lech Kaczynski

Drodzy Rodacy prosze zobaczcie negatywna historie prywatyzacji w Argentynie zloza naturalne woda wszystko

Drodzy Rodacy prosze zobaczcie negatywna historie prywatyzacji w Argentynie zloza naturalne woda wszystko

co im zostalo? Polacy uczmy sie z bledow innych

Argentina's Economic Collapse - Part 5 of 12
Documentary on the events that led to the economic collapse of Argentina in 2001 which wiped out the middle class and raised the level of poverty to 57.5%. Central to the collapse was the implementation of neo-liberal policies which enabled the swindle of billions of dollars by foreign banks and corporations. Many of Argentina's assets and resources were shamefully plundered. Its financial system was even used for money laundering by Citibank, Credit Suisse, and JP Morgan. The net result was massive wealth transfers and the impoverishment of society which culminated in many deaths due to oppression and malnutrition. Official name: Memoria del Saqueo by Fernando Solanas 2003.


Argentina's Economic Collapse - Part 6 of 12






International Monetary Fund Miedzynarodowy Fundusz Walutowy z Waszyngtonu chce wepchac dla Poski niepotrzebny kredyt na 20.5 miliarda dolarow
aby Rzad Donalda Tuska zalatal finance.

Komu na tym zalezy i kto to popiera?
Sama linia kredytowa bez pobrania bedzie kosztowac setki milionow zlotych. Ile szpitali czy szkol mozna za to wybudowac.
Wczesniej Goldman Sachs manipulowal polskim zlotym z teraz chca nas wiecej zadluzyc.
Zdaniem Katarzyny Zajdel-Kurowskiej ktora nie placi podatku w USA i w Polsce reprezentant Polski w IMF na prywatnej rozmowie powiedziala za Polska zawsze glosuje w linii za co im zapłacą starsi i mądrzejsi,
to prawda potwierdzone. Belka tez tam pracuje.

Polacy rodacy prosimy pisac listy protestu i dzwonic do

Kontakt

Centrala
tel. (+48 22) 694 55 55
e-mail: kancelaria@mofnet.gov.pl
adres: Ministerstwo Finansów 00-916 Warszawa ul. Świętokrzyska 12

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--------------------------------------------------------------
Kancelaria Prezesa Rady Ministrów jest podzielona na komórki organizacyjne, które mają określone zadania i kompetencje. Działają tu także sekretariaty osób zajmujących kierownicze stanowiska państwowe w KPRM. Komórkami organizacyjnymi Kancelarii, poza gabinetem politycznym Premiera, kierują dyrektorzy.

Kontakt do sekretariatu Dyrektora Generalnego:
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http://www.premier.gov.pl/kancelaria_premiera/departamenty/

Dane kontaktowe do poszczególnych departamentów znajdują się w dziale DEPARTAMENTY.


The Shock Doctrine




Argentina's Economic Collapse - Part 1 of 12




Sytuacja Polski w oczach MFW pozostaje bez zmian
Wtorek, 13 kwietnia (19:40)
Zdaniem Katarzyny Zajdel-Kurowskiej, przedstawiciela Polski przy MFW, sytuacja Polski po sobotniej katastrofie w oczach MFW i inwestorów zagranicznych nie uległa zmianie. Fundusz podtrzymuje swoje oczekiwania wobec Polski w kwestii działań w polityce fiskalnej i monetarnej oraz ze spokojem oczekuje na decyzje personalne w instytucjach państwowych.

AFP
Zajdel-Kurowska podkreśliła, że z punktu widzenia MFW powinny nadal być realizowane zalecenia, które Fundusz przedstawił Ministerstwu Finansów i NBP w marcu. "Te rekomendacje są dosyć klarowne. W kwestii polityki fiskalnej należy opracować średniookresowy plan konsolidacji finansów tak, aby zadłużenie państwa nie narastało.

W kwestii polityki monetarnej doradzaliśmy, aby nie spieszyć się z podwyżkami stóp, bo ożywienie gospodarcze na świecie, szczególnie w Europie, jest bardzo kruche, nietrwałe. Aby to nie przełożyło się na ożywienie w Polsce na razie doradzamy ostrożność ze zmianami stóp" - powiedziała we wtorek w TVN CNBC Zajdel-Kurowska. "Te zalecenia nie ulegną zmianie i powinniśmy je wprowadzać w życie" - dodała. Zajdel-Kurowska powiedziała, że MFW nie obawia się zakłócenia działalności państwa i instytucji wobec tragicznej śmierci kluczowych dla funkcjonowania państwa osób. "MFW przyjęło ze spokojem wszystkie komentarze od marszałka Komorowskiego, również instytucjonalnie nic nie ulega zmianie.

czytaj dalej


Państwo jest przygotowane do realizowania funkcji państwowych, rząd i NBP działają sprawnie i to jest najważniejsze. Tutaj nie było absolutnie żadnych obaw o zachwianie na rynkach finansowych czy postrzeganie Polski przez inwestorów" - powiedziała. Zajdel-Kurowska dodała, że MFW nie ingeruje w kwestię roli p.o. prezesa NBP Piotra Wiesiołka w RPP. "Do tych spraw podchodzimy w sposób makroekonomiczny, globalny. Każdy członek Funduszu ma swoje uwarunkowania prawne w tych kwestiach.

To są sprawy wewnętrzne i należy je oddać prawnikom. Fundusz nie jest w tej kwestii ekspertem" - powiedziała. "Fundusz obserwuje dalsze wydarzenia i przyjmie te rozstrzygnięcia, które zostaną zastosowane" - dodała. Zajdel-Kurowska uważa, że wobec wysokich rezerw walutowych Polska nie jest narażona na ataki spekulacyjne i złoty nie jest zagrożony. "Wszystkie doświadczenia interwencji na świecie pokazują, że bardzo trudno jest walczyć z trendem. Silne fundamenty gospodarcze przyciągają inwestorów do Polski.

To nie jest zły trend. To co powinno być monitorowane, to tempo napływu kapitału, aby, gdy zmieni się sytuacja w gospodarce światowej i stopy w innych krajach, nie doszło do zbyt gwałtownego odpływu kapitału" - powiedziała. "Interwencje mają duży wymiar psychologiczny. Zawsze gdy bank centralny wchodzi na rynek to ma to wymowny i silny wpływ na inwestorów. Polska ma bardzo wysokie rezerwy walutowe, jest silna i to również jest bardzo ważnym elementem dla inwestorów, bo nie rzucają się oni na kraje, które są silne. Tutaj nie obawiałabym się, żeby coś groziło Polsce i złotemu" - dodała.

Zdaniem Zajdel-Kurowskiej, na ożywienie gospodarcze w Polsce większy wpływ niż kurs złotego będzie miała sytuacja na rynku pracy. "Radzimy sobie wciąż bardzo dobrze, natomiast to, co obecnie ma większe przełożenie na gospodarkę niż kurs złotego to jest sytuacja na rynku pracy. Oczywiście, zbyt duża aprecjacja złotego będzie miała negatywny wpływ na dynamikę polskiego eksportu, to się przełoży na konkurencyjność polskich towarów.

To, co jest istotne, to jest sytuacja na rynku pracy, jeśli dojdzie do wzrostu stopy bezrobocia - ale ten trend nie jest jeszcze niepokojący, poczekajmy jeszcze z oceną kilka miesięcy" - powiedziała. "Jeśli nie dojdzie do wzrostu bezrobocia to nie powinno być osłabienia wzrostu gospodarczego" - dodała.


May 5 (Bloomberg) -- Poland will apply to the International Monetary Fund to extend a $20.5 billion flexible credit line after the central bank said it won’t defy the government’s wishes.

Finance Minister Jacek Rostowski asked the bank’s acting Governor Piotr Wiesiolek to endorse the application to extend the one-year facility, which expires today, the Finance Ministry said in an e-mailed statement. Deputy Governor Witold Kozinski, said the bank will drop its opposition to renewing the loan if the Finance Ministry insists, according to the statement

Poland was the only country in the EU that refused to strengthen its currency, as its Zloty being weak was a benefit to the Polish economy in exports, employment and tax revenues. The national bank governor had said he would not take loans from the IMF…they had even been so bold as to offer to loan the IMF money! But after the governor’s untimely death the IMF loans have started against his plans.

Poland is the only country that is not in recession in Europe, it’s actually grown 2.75% this year, and 1.7% last year, and growth projections are even higher for next year. Its debt is quite low compared to other countries at around 50% of its GDP. We can expect Poland to be absorbed into the Eurozone and increasing the size of its debts as its Central Bank governor was taken in the crash.

Co dalej z pożyczką z MFW
k.k. 05-05-2010, ostatnia aktualizacja 05-05-2010 02:06
Dziś wygasa porozumienie o udostępnieniu Polsce elastycznej linii kredytowej Międzynarodowego Funduszu Walutowego

Rok temu MFW postawił do dyspozycji Polski kwotę 20,6 mld dol. Środki zasiliły rezerwy walutowe NBP i miały być wykorzystywane na wypadek zmian na rynkach zagrażających stabilności systemu finansowego.

Choć dotąd Polska z nich nie skorzystała, to rząd wielokrotnie deklarował, że przedłużenie umowy jest wskazane. W resorcie finansów nie udało nam się dowiedzieć, czy jego szef poprosił NBP o zgodę na przedłużenie umowy. Jeśli tak się stanie, to nie od razu zostaniemy objęci parasolem MFW. – Najpierw pracownicy oceniają, czy dany kraj spełnia kryteria, potem odbywa się nieformalne spotkanie Rady Dyrektorów i po kilku dniach – formalne. W praktyce to trwa dwa – trzy tygodnie – mówi Katarzyna Zajdel-Kurowska, zastępca dyrektora wykonawczego MFW.

Wszystko wyjaśnić się może dziś – wiceprezes NBP Piotr Koziński zwołał konferencję w sprawie pożyczki z MFW.

Czy Polska popelnia blad Argentyny i Grecji? Stoczniowcy zajmujcie stocznie to jest dorobek Polski Nas a nie Rzadu Tuska.to swoje to nasze!


PolishAmericanDC zajac Polskie przez Pracownikow.
kazdy bedzie mial jeden vote. Taka sama placa dla wszystkich.
Stoczniowcy na co czekacie?  do dziela!
Zadłużenie zagraniczne do spłaty w tym roku wynosi 63,9 mld euro

Zadłużenie zagr. ogółem Polski wzrosło w II kw. do 176,563 mld euro - NBP 14:18 30.09.2009




30.6.Warszawa (PAP) - Zadłużenie zagraniczne Polski ogółem wzrosło w II kwartale 2009 roku do 176.53 mln euro ze 169.827 mln euro w I kwartale 2009 roku - podał NBP.

Z tego zadłużenie długoterminowe wzrosło do 129.573 mln euro ze 125.059 mln euro w II kwartale, a zadłużenie krótkoterminowe do 46.990 mln euro z 44.78 mln euro.

Zadłużenie przedsiębiorstw wzrosło do 80.510 mln euro w II kwartale z 78.515 mln euro w I kwartale 2009 roku.

Zadłużenie sektora bankowego wzrosło z 42.135 mln euro z 41.761 mln euro.

Zadłużenie rządu i samorządu wzrosło do 51.612 mln euro z 47.840 mln euro (PAP)


Warszawa, 29.06.2007 (ISB) - Zadłużenie zagraniczne Polski ogółem wzrosło do 131,70 mld euro na koniec I kw. 2007 roku z 127,71 mld euro na koniec IV kw. 2006 roku, podał Narodowy Bank Polski w komunikacie w piątek.

W I kw. 2006 roku zadłużenia zagraniczne wynosiło 115,0 mld euro.

Zadłużenie zagraniczne sektora rządowego i samorządowego wzrosło w I kwartale 2007 roku do 53,5 mld euro z 51,62 mld euro w IV kwartale 2006 roku i wobec 52,15 mld euro rok wcześniej.

W tym samym czasie zadłużenie zagraniczne sektora bankowego wzrosło do 17,95 mld euro z 17,67 mld euro na koniec grudnia 2006 i wobec 12,747 mld euro rok wcześniej. (ISB)
Ile to podobienstwa
Argentyński CUD ekonomiczny
prof. dr Ronald Clement 18-08-2006 10:44
To bylo kilka lat temu, kiedy korporacyjne telewizje pokazywaly straszna sytuacje w Argentynie – panstwie o burzliwej przeszlosci aczkolwiek do czasu wprowadzenia ekonomii globalnej niezle dajacym sobie rade. Tlumy protestujacych na ulicach, zolnierze strzelajacy do tych tlumów. Dymy, petardy, ogien i bezrobocie, które przekroczylo 22%. Argentyna w roku 2001 znalazla sie na dnie przepasci, z której, wedlug zachodnich ekonomistów, nie bylo juz wyjscia. Globalisci, przemyslowcy i bankierzy masowo opuszczali kraj zabierajac co jeszcze tylko bylo mozna. Media dostaly nakaz, aby zapomniec o tym kraju i o jego istnieniu.
Argentyna walczy i zwycieza - korporacyjne media nie moga dopuscic byscie sie Panstwo o tym dowiedzieli

W grudniu 2001 roku Argentyna znalazla sie w dole ekonomicznym, do którego zostala zepchnieta przez elity i globalizm. Banki przestaly wyplacac pieniadze. Ekonomii kraju nikt nie byl juz w stanie kontrolowac. Sprawujacy wczesniej wladze, prezydent Carlos Menem, przemyslowiec wybrany na swój urzad w roku 1989, obiecywal Argentynczykom piekne kobiety i samochody Ferrari. Od kuchni zas wyprzedawal gospodarke panstwa w obce rece po smiesznych cenach. Pozyczal ogromne sumy pieniedzy z Banku Swiatowego i Miedzynarodowego Funduszu Walutowego (MFW). Mieszkancy Argentyny, która dzieki pozyczonym pieniadzom znalazla sie w stanie bezprecedensowego rozkwitu, wiwatowali na czesc swojego prezydenta i oglosili go geniuszem wolnego rynku.

Sielanka sie skonczyla, gdy trzeba bylo zaczac zwracac pozyczone pieniadze. W roku 2001 produkt narodowy zmniejszyl sie az o 11%. Kraj jednak nie otrzymal od Miedzynarodowego Funduszu Walutowego zadnych dodatkowych pieniedzy, ani zadnych konkretnych rad.

Gdy lala sie krew

Historia Argentyny pelna jest nieudanych powstan, zrywów, protestów i wojen. Pelna jest takze biedy mas i niewyobrazalnego bogactwa grupki wybranych. Pelna jest korupcji, straszliwych tortur i faszystowskich kazamatów. Jednak pod koniec lat 1990tych oniemial caly swiat. To, co dzialo sie na ulicach Argentyny bylo ostrzezeniem i przepowiednia dla zwolenników globalnej ekonomii.

Prywatnie dziennikarze zastanawiali sie jak to mozliwe, ze mozna zniszczyc cale panstwo w tak krótkim czasie. Jak to mozliwe, ze nikt tego nie zauwazyl i nie zaradzil. Takie pytania krazyly w internecie i w prywatnych rozmowach. Na stronach gazet i w dziennikach telewizyjnych goniono za sensacja i bredzono cos o nieodpowiedzialnosci fiskalnej na skale panstwa. Wina obarczono bardzo szybko przecietnych Argentynczyków i nowego prezydenta Argentyny, De la Rua.

W roku 1999, kiedy De la Rua zostal wybrany na prezydenta, a kraj znajdowal sie juz w 3-letniej recesji, szczekaczka CNN oglaszala, ze Menem nie zostal wybrany dlatego, poniewaz wedlug konstytucji nie mógl startowac w wyborach po raz trzeci. Menem zapowiedzial jednak, ze wystartuje w wyborach w roku 2003. Menem nalezal do partii Peronistów, najwiekszej sily politycznej w Argentynie. Byl silnie zwiazany ze Stanami Zjednoczonymi, globalizmem i wolnym rynkiem.

Nowemu prezydentowi Argentyny nie pozostawiono niemal zadnego ruchu. W dalszym ciagu wladze dzierzyli Peronisci, którzy juz od samego poczatku atakowali swego prezydenta. De la Rua w swoich przemówieniach prosil Argentynczyków: Prosze Was o to byscie zrozumieli jak wazna jest jednosc. Chce byc prezydentem wszystkich Argentynczyków.

Gdy nastapil krach, Miedzynarodowy Fundusz Walutowy pierwszy umyl rece. Jego eksperci twierdzili, ze Argentyna wydawala za duzo pieniedzy, pomimo ze budzet panstwa byl znacznie mniejszy niz budzet USA podczas wielkiego kryzysu. Gdy ekonomisci wysmiali takie tlumaczenie, prawnicy Miedzynarodowego Funduszu Walutowego przystapili do szturmu. Twierdzili, ze Argentyna posiadala takie prawa rozdzielania pozyczek, do których fundusz musial sie dostosowac, które uniemozliwily normalne funkcjonowanie ekonomiczne. Oznacza to, ze fundusz kaze nam wierzyc, iz biedna Argentyna dyktowala mu warunki.

Caly ten spektakl byl nadzorowany przez elity USA. Przez ostatnich 55 lat, podczas calego istnienia Miedzynarodowego Funduszu Walutowego, glos Stanów Zjednoczonych w tej organizacji byl decydujacy. Inne bogate kraje czlonkowskie z latwoscia moglyby sprzeciwic sie USA w glosowaniu i wygrac. Dziwnym trafem nigdy tego nie zrobily. Gdy jednak przyjrzymy sie blizej MFW stwierdzimy, ze tak naprawde jest to kartel pozyczkodawców zarzadzany przez amerykanskie Ministerstwo Skarbu. Nie nalezy sie wiec dziwic, ze rzad USA, a za nim poslusznie amerykanskie i wreszcie zachodnie media, jednoglosnie twierdzily, ze Argentyna musi byc posluszna regulom narzuconym jej przez MFW.

Ekonomiczna analiza

Dzisiaj wiemy juz, dlaczego upadla ekonomia Argentyny – chociaz media tego nie chca podawac. Prosze tutaj o szczególna uwage Czytelników w Polsce. W roku 1991, Menem oparl ekonomie panstwa o „wyzsza” walute, jaka byl USD. Wprowadzono wymiane argentynskiego peso na USD w stalym stosunku 1:1. Menem mial nadzieje, ze USD stanie sie w ten sposób szybko waluta obiegowa w Argentynie. Byla to na poczatku niezla idea, ale wkrótce okazalo sie, ze wartosc USD zostala zawyzona. Zawyzyla sie takze automatycznie wartosc argentynskiego peso. Zwrócmy uwage jak funkcjonuje Euro w Polsce.

W momencie, gdy inwestorzy zorientowali sie, ze wartosc peso jest zawyzona, zaczeli sie obawiac, ze musi upasc. Dlatego zaczeli sie domagac coraz wyzszej stopy procentowej na wszystkim. Takze na pozyczkach prywatnych i rzadowych. To spowodowalo powstanie ogromnego dlugu. Stopa procentowa zostala podwyzszona o 40%.

Aby utrzymac oparcie na walucie amerykanskiej, rzad Argentyny musial w bankach posiadac odpowiednia ilosc USD. W miare poglebiania sie kryzysu rzad musial kupowac coraz wiecej USD po znacznie zawyzonej cenie. Coraz wiecej ludzi domagalo sie transakcji gotówkowych. Ten proces wepchnal Argentyne w dlug wysokosci 140 mld USD. W grudniu 2001 roku, rzad Argentyny obwiescil swiatu, ze nie jest w stanie nic placic. Argentyna zostala parnasem narodów.

Aby utrzymac zawyzona wartosc peso, Miedzynarodowy Fundusz Walutowy dal Argentynie ogromne pozyczki. Tylko jednego roku do skarbu panstwa wplynelo 40 mld USD, jako pakiet zorganizowany przez wiele pozyczajacych instytucji. Gwarantem, ze te pozyczki sie splaca byl jeden podstawowy wymóg – utrzymac zerowy deficyt. Czyli Argentyna musiala balansowac na poziomie 100% budzetu. Podczas recesji niemozliwe jest utrzymanie 100% budzetu, poza tym wymaga to bardzo bolesnych operacji, jak ciecia budzetowe, które powoduja wysokie bezrobocie, by w koncu doprowadzic do zamieszek ulicznych na wielka skale.

Jak ten proces wygladal od strony zwyklego, ciezko pracujacego Argentynczyka? Na poczatku lat 1990tych namawiano Argentynczyków do kupowania niemal wszystkiego. Prywatyzowano firmy i laczono w konglomeraty. Namawiano do budowania domów poprzez udzielanie niskoprocentowych pozyczek. Namawiano do zakladania biznesów i dawano zwalnianym ludziom pakiety wyrównawcze. Sredniej klasie pokazywano luksusowe samochody i sprzedawano je na bardzo niskich przedplatach, wysokich procentowo pozyczkach i dlugich terminach splat. Media krzyczaly, ze przeciez jest tak dobrze, ze kazdego na pewno bedzie stac na splate samochodu, czy domu. Mozesz to wszystko miec juz dzisiaj – splacac bedziesz pózniej. Argentynczycy, podobnie jak Polacy, zachlysneli sie tym dobrobytem nie wiedzac, ze zastawiono na nich pulapke. Po 40 latach biedy i wojen wreszcie to, co do tej pory ogladali na amerykanskich filmach mogli miec w ogrodzie, czy w garazu.

Wraz z zachodnim kapitalem naplyneli ludzie, których zadaniem bylo nadzorowac jego przeplyw. Uczyli Argentynczyków na czym polega wolny rynek i globalna ekonomia (globalny dobrobyt). Wkrótce posiadali oni tak wielkie wplywy na struktury panstwowe Argentyny, ze panstwo praktycznie utracilo niepodleglosc.

W momencie, kiedy USD kupowano za peso w stosunku 1:1 wszystko, co wytwarzano w Argentynie a takze uslugi, staly sie za drogie, by móc byc towarem eksportowym. Cale panstwo, podobnie jak Polske i inne kraje, zaduszono. Import towarów byl znacznie tanszy niz ich wytwarzanie. W ten sposób zniszczono prawie 10% dochodu narodowego.

Masowe prywatyzacje na poczatku lat 1990tych niemal calego majatku narodowego, za frakcje wartosci rynkowej, juz spowodowaly bezrobocie na duza skale. Prywatyzowano glównie zaklady elektryczne, komunalne, telefoniczne itd. Globalisci maja doskonale opanowany ten proces. Prywatyzacje zaczyna sie zawsze od wybranych sektorów kluczowych. Po dokonaniu takiej prywatyzacji, sektory wspólpracujace staja sie niedostosowane (kompatybilnosc struktur finansowych i zarzadzania). Wtedy nie ma innego wyjscia, tylko trzeba prywatyzowac spiralnie do góry wszystkie sektory gospodarki. Gdy spirala prywatyzacji krecila sie do góry, spirala zwolnien szla w dól. Na dole znajdowala sie coraz wieksza liczba osób bez pracy i w koncu bez zadnych srodków do zycia.

W skali panstwa ruch spirali do góry równowazony byl przez ruch do dolu. W koncu coraz wiecej ludzi przestawalo robic zakupy, pieniadze przestawaly sie krecic. Podatki równiez. Argentynscy biedacy nie placili podatków, bo i z czego – zamiast tego zaopatrywali sie w karabiny. Gdy pieniadze przestawaly sie krecic, teraz juz sprywatyzowane biznesy, zwalnialy coraz wiecej ludzi, aby utrzymac zdolnosc ekonomiczna przedsiebiorstw. Te trzy wzajemnie powiazane ze soba kryzysy (podatki, bezrobocie, zawyzona wartosc waluty) spowodowaly to, ze rzad Argentyny zaczal blagac MFW o pomoc, lub rade. Miedzynarodowy Fundusz Walutowy, po dlugich negocjacjach zdecydowal. Argentyna jest za bardzo zadluzona. Nie mozemy pomóc. Pozostawmy to panstwo w stanie swobodnego spadania w otchlan. Na wielu militarnych naradach podjeto równiez decyzje jak odciac Argentyne od swiata zewnetrznego, gdyby przewidywane powstanie zbrojne zaczelo sie przelewac przez granice.

Ta decyzja MFW spowodowala, ze przewidujac spadek wartosci peso, Argentynczycy ruszyli na banki, by wybrac swoje oszczednosci. Banki zostaly zamkniete, place w wielu sektorach gospodarki wstrzymane. Zrozpaczony prezydent Argentyny oglosil, ze Argentyna przestaje splacac swoje dlugi. Prasa przewidywala, ze beda sie tam dzialy dantejskie sceny, po czym przestala sie sprawa interesowac.

Argentynski cud

Wydawalo sie, ze dla Argentyny nie ma juz ratunku. Szczury zaczely opuszczac tonacy okret. Prezydent Menem wyjechal do Chile. Biznesmeni i ich miedzynarodowi doradcy rozjezdzali sie do swoich krajów. Nawet drobni biznesmeni, których rodzice przyjechali do Argentyny w poszukiwaniu lepszego zycia, na gwalt starali sie o wizy wjazdowe do swoich rodzinnych krajów. Pozostawiano na pastwe losu cale fabryki z parkiem maszynowym – w których nie oplacalo sie nic produkowac. Pracowników zostawiano na bruku. Pozostawiano piekne rezydencje z basenami i cale biurowce wylozone marmurami. Ci, którzy doprowadzili do kryzysu wynosili sie jak szarancza na inne pola, które mozna bylo jeszcze objesc.

Magazyn „Time” zastanawial sie: Co dalej moze zrobic De La Rua? To jest pytanie za milion dolarów. Obojetne czy sam, czy w jakiejs koalicji, natychmiast potrzebuje planu, aby zlagodzic kryzys. Musi pomóc ludziom napelnic brzuchy i byc moze odnowic wzrost gospodarczy. Problem jest taki, ze aby zlagodzic skutki kryzysu dzialajace na biednych, rzad musi wydac miliony dolarów na jedzenie i podstawowe potrzeby. To spowoduje poglebienie kryzysu finansowego. Cos musi sie stac...

I stalo sie. Argentynczycy zawierzyli swojemu prezydentowi, który zerwal rokowania z miedzynarodowa finansjera. Wojsko, policja i zwykli ludzie staneli murem. Twierdzili, ze Argentyna nalezy do Argentynczyków a nie do miedzynarodowej mafii finansowej. Osamotniony rzad Argentyny podjal decyzje, które wprowadzily Bialy Dom i miedzynarodowych bankierów w furie. Wbrew zaleceniom uwolniono wartosc wymienna peso. Minister ekonomii Roberto Lavagna stwierdzil: Utrzymanie konkurencyjnych cen wymiany walutowej pomoze eksportowi i zaspokojeniu potrzeb kraju. Zdecydowano sie równiez zaprzestac polityki wolnego rynku, której ekonomia krajowa byla wiezniem. Nawiazano wspólprace ekonomiczna z Brazylia i Chinami. Kapital zaczal naplywac do kraju. Bank Centralny zaczal znowu skupowac USD, ale tylko tyle, ile potrzebne jest do utrzymania wzrostu ekonomicznego.

Gdy Argentyna oglosila, ze jest w stanie po trzech latach od chwili odejscia od zwyrodnialych idei globalistów, zaplacic po 30 centów za kazdego dolara dlugu i utrzymac swój niespotykany wzrost ekonomiczny, najpierw jej nie dowierzano. Pózniej surowo zakazano donosic o tym mediom. Nie dziwmy sie, jest to bowiem namacalny dowód jak szybko ekonomie poszczególnych panstw i zycie ich mieszkanców moze sie poprawic gdy zerwa one z globalistycznymi niedorzecznosciami.

Brytyjski „Guardian” w grudniu 2004 roku pisal: Trzy lata temu, w grudniu, Argentyna byla w kryzysie. Ekonomia staczala sie niekontrolowanie w przepasc, banki zamknely swoje podwoje dla inwestorów, prezydenci zmieniali sie co tydzien... Dzisiaj powszechne odczucia wsród ekonomistów w Buenos Aires sa takie, ze panstwo wygrzebalo sie z najgorszego. Tak, Argentyna ciagle zmaga sie ze skomplikowanym procesem rekonstrukcji zadluzenia, ale ekonomia przeszla niesamowite zmiany...

Jak Feniks, ekonomia podzwignela sie z popiolów. Po spadku 11% produktu narodowego w roku 2002, w 2003 roku wzrósl on o prawie 9% i wzrosnie o nastepnych 8% w tym roku. Rzad ostroznie oznajmia, ze w roku 2005 wzrosnie on o 4%, ale wiekszosc ekspertów ekonomicznych wierzy, ze faktyczny wzrost bedzie wynosil 5%...

Te zalozenia „wolnego rynku” byly zle dla miejsc pracy. Bezrobocie osiagnelo w roku 2002 swoje apogeum i wynosilo 22%. Teraz wynosi 12%...

Czy jestescie wierzacy, czy nie. Niektórzy mówia o podniesieniu sie Argentyny jako o cudzie, którego nie mógl przeprowadzic Rodrigo Rato, dyrektor MFW. Reka Boga okazala sie znacznie potezniejsza niz reka Miedzynarodowego Funduszu Walutowego. Teraz juz nikt nie oszukuje.

Druga rzecz, która taja media, to fakt absolutnego zjednoczenia klasy robotników z klasa menadzerów.

Gdy siedzieli bezczynnie na ulicach

Gdy fabrykanci zamykali fabryki i uciekali do innych krajów, poniewaz produkcja byla nieoplacalna, pracownicy i kierownictwo tracilo prace i zasiedlalo pobliskie kawiarnie i lawki. Dyskutowano glównie jak poprawic swoje zycie i sytuacje przeznaczonego na zatracenie kraju. Pracownicy takich opuszczonych fabryk jak Zanon, tesknie spogladali na bramy. W zakladach tych spedzili wiekszosc swego zycia. W koncu podjeli decyzje. Weszli na tereny opuszczonych i zdewastowanych fabryk. Ustanowili rady zakladowe, uruchomili maszyny i zaczeli produkowac z materialów znajdujacych sie jeszcze w magazynach.

Na to niemal komunistyczne zachowanie ludzi, wladze i wojsko patrzyly przychylnie. Wkrótce do tokarzy, szlifierzy i magazynierów dolaczyli kierownicy dzialów, pracownicy biur i dyrektorzy ekonomiczni. W rekordowym czasie uruchomiono sprzedaz i eksport. Nie bylo wyznaczonych godzin pracy. Decyzje w swoich fabrykach, ludzie podejmowali podczas krótkich narad produkcyjnych.

Okazalo sie, ze produkcja jest oplacalna i potrzebna. To, co nie oplacalo sie globalistom, zaczelo sie oplacac zwyklym ludziom. Bez pomocy banków i karteli finansowych. Wkrótce produkcja i sprzedaz osiagnela w niektórych fabrykach rekordowe poziomy. Ludzie dzielili sie dochodami pomiedzy soba. Nigdy jeszcze nie zarabiali takich sum pieniedzy. Zaczeli je wiec wydawac. Ruszylo budownictwo i inne galezie przemyslu.

Wszystko to stalo sie w tak krótkim czasie, ze Ameryka nie zdazyla nawet oglosic Argentyny panstwem komunistycznym. Utworzono Ruch Pracowników Bez Pracy (MTD). Ruch ten wkrótce posiadal mozliwosci prowadzenia nacisków politycznych. I to byla jeszcze jedna tajemnica cudu argentynskiego.

Szczury wracaja

Sytuacja Argentyny zaczela sie poprawiac. Globalisci i fabrykanci zaczeli wracac i domagac sie zwrotu zagrabionych przez ludzi fabryk. Ci, którzy pozostawili trzy lata temu panstwo na progu wojny domowej, teraz zaczynaja sie domagac, powolujac sie na miedzynarodowe prawo. Czy cos to Polakom przypomina?

MTD, która powstala niemal na ulicach, jest silna. Grozi masowymi demonstracjami. Ceramiczna fabryka Zanon, pierwsza przejeta przez pracowników i doprowadzona do stanu zakladu przynoszacego profit, jak niegdys Stocznia Gdanska dla Polaków, stala sie dla Argentynczyków symbolem nowego i lepszego. MTD uwazana jest przez CIA i inne podobne organizacje, jako grupa, której udalo sie wytworzyc najnowoczesniejsze strategie i rozwiazania jednoczenia i obrony ludzi przed kapitalizmem.

Powracajace szczury miedzynarodowej finansjery atakuja. Poniewaz Argentyna stanowi znaczne niebezpieczenstwo dla calej globalnej ekonomii, nalezy przypuszczac, ze gdyby USA nie byly zaangazowane w Iraku, juz dawno amerykanscy zolnierze w imie demokracji broniliby swojej ropy pod argentynska trawa, tudziez broniliby tam wolnosci swojego kraju.

Nowy prezydent Argentyny, Kirchner, domaga sie ekstradycji bylego prezydenta Menema, który przebywa w Chile. Menem jest poszukiwany przez wladze argentynskie za korupcje i doprowadzenie kraju do ruiny. Mial on startowac w wyborach prezydenckich w roku 2007 i przyrzekal fabrykantom zwrócenie ich wlasnosci. Oczywiscie dlatego cieszy sie poparciem miedzynarodowej finansjery i moze sobie drwic z nakazów i decyzji sadów argentynskich.

W styczniu 2005 roku, miedzynarodowi bankierzy zgodzili sie na propozycje rzadu Argentyny zaplacenia 25 centów za kazdy dolar dlugu. Stala sie rzecz niespotykana. Argentyna wypowiedziala wojne MFW i jeszcze kilku wielkim organizacjom globalistycznym i wygrala. Argentyna nie tylko pod oslona swojego wojska zaszantazowala globalistów, ale takze odmówila negocjacji z 700 tys. wlascicieli panstwowych akcji (bondów). Argentyna ma otwarta droge by byc przyjeta w poczet spoleczenstwa miedzynarodowego, z którego zostala wczesniej wyrzucona. I to na swoich warunkach, jako pelnoprawny czlonek sam podejmujacy decyzje.

Wielu bankierów i inwestorów miedzynarodowych oskarza Argentyne o totalitaryzm oraz oszukanie inwestorów i pozyczkodawców. To spowodowalo klótnie w lonie wielkich finansistów, wsród nich Wlochów i Amerykanów, którzy twierdza, ze gdyby nie 11 wrzesnia, to rozmawialiby z Argentynczykami inaczej.

W trzy miesiace pózniej IMF zaczal sie na nowo domagac pelnej splaty dlugów. Jednak Argentyna w ekonomicznym ukladzie z Brazylia i Chinami czula sie juz na tyle silna, aby bankierom na Wall Street pokazac jak „staly dwa drzewa i jedno sie zlamalo...” (w oryginale, prof. Clement pisal o srodkowym palcu prawej reki – Red.). Argentyna zaczela swiatu udowadniac, ze okolo polowa kredytodawców juz odniosla spore profity z argentynskich dlugów i ze to nie jest w porzadku, aby domagala sie nastepnych. To stanowisko wyeksponowaly chinskie i indyjskie media. Przy okazji, Argentyna na papierze udowodnila swiatu, w jaki sposób próbowano ja zbankrutowac i co to w praktyce oznaczalo.

Brytyjski „Guardian” pisze: Trzy rzeczy pracowaly na korzysc Argentyny. Po pierwsze, karta Kirchnera byla silna dzieki silnej ekonomii. Po drugie, zaczela wychodzic prawda o Miedzynarodowym Funduszu Walutowym. Dlatego chcial doprowadzic do szybkiej ugody. Po trzecie, Wall Street wyniósl sie z Argentyny tuz przed kryzysem i negocjacje prowadzily banki europejskie. Amerykanskie Ministerstwo Skarbu nie bylo pod naciskami, aby postepowac twardo z Argentyna. Takze nie chciano, aby Kirchner zbratal sie z silnym populista, prezydentem Brazylii, Lula...

W slady Argentyny – pokazania globalistom tylnej czesci ciala, moze isc teraz wiele zadluzonych krajów. W tym takze i Polska. I tego wlasnie finansjera obawia sie najbardziej. Zostal stworzony precedens. Stosunkowo malo znaczacy kraj, przyparty do muru sprzeciwil sie utartym sloganom demokracji, prawa i wolnego rynku. I wygral – przynajmniej jak na razie. Dla innych krajów zaistniala wielka szansa. Teraz, kiedy armia amerykanska uwiklana jest w Iraku, mozna zrzucic jarzmo. Tylko trzeba chciec i do tego dazyc. Tak jak zrobili to mieszkancy Argentyny niezaleznie od funkcji spolecznej, majatku i wyksztalcenia.


prof. dr Ronald Clement


Materialy zródlowe:

Alavio Grupo, March in Defence of Zanon, Z magazine, 17 wrzesnia 2004.

Balch Oliver, Taking care of business, Guardian, 3 czerwca 2005.

Burgo Ezequiel, Argentinas miraculous recovery owes little to the IMF, Guardian, 13 grudnia 2004.

Elliot Larry, Who needs the hand of God?, Guardian, 7 marca 2005.

Free-Market Flop: What Happened in Argentina, (www.americas.org/item_77).

Goni Uki, Argentina seeks arrest of Menem, Guardian, 22 kwietnia 2004.

Hacher Sebastian, Beneton vs. Mapuche, Z magazine, 6 czerwca 2005.

Katel Peter, Argentinas Crisis Explained, Time, 20 grudnia 2001.

Morduchowicz Daniel, Manufacturing militiants, Z magazine, 8 maja 2005.

New Argentinian president-elect pleads for national unity, CNN, 25 pazdziernika 1999.

The 100 billion dollar question, Guardian, 13 stycznia 2005.

Whitbeck Harris, Struggling economy fuels Argentine emigration, CNN, 23 lipca 2001.
Zbyt duze zadluzenie Polski i Polakow na rynkach miedzynarodowych finansow
Prosi o klopoty.
Kto popycha Polske i Polakow do tak duzego zadluzenia?


Argentina Didn't Fall on Its Own
Wall Street Pushed Debt Till the Last

By Paul Blustein
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, August 3, 2003;

BUENOS AIRES -- Ah, the memories: Feasting on slabs of tender Argentine steak. Skiing at a resort overlooking a shimmering lake in the Andes. And late-night outings to a "gentlemen's club" in a posh Buenos Aires neighborhood.

Such diversions awaited the investment bankers, brokers and money managers who flocked to Argentina in the late 1990s. In those days, Wall Street firms touted Argentina as one of the world's hottest economies as they raked in fat fees for marketing the country's stocks and bonds.


The human scale of Argentina's crisis: People wait to search for food in garbage

Thus were sown the seeds of one of the most spectacular economic collapses in modern history, a debacle in which Wall Street played a major role.

The fantasyland that Argentina represented for foreign financiers came to a catastrophic end early last year, when the government defaulted on most of its $141 billion debt and devalued the nation's currency. A wrenching recession left well over a fifth of the labor force jobless and threw millions into poverty.

An extensive review of the conduct of financial market players in Argentina reveals Wall Street's complicity in those events. Investment bankers, analysts and bond traders served their own interests when they pumped up euphoria about the country's prospects, with disastrous results.

Big securities firms reaped nearly $1 billion in fees from underwriting Argentine government bonds during the decade 1991-2001, and those firms' analysts were generally the ones producing the most bullish and influential reports on the country. Similar conflicts of interest involving analysts' research have come to light in other flameouts of the "bubble" era, such as Enron Corp. and WorldCom Inc. In Argentina's case, though, the injured party was not a group of stockholders or 401(k) owners, it was South America's second-largest country.

Other factors besides optimistic analyses impelled foreigners to pour funds into Argentina with such reckless abandon as to make the eventual crash more likely and more devastating. One was Wall Street's system for rating the performance of mutual fund and pension fund managers, who were major buyers of Argentine bonds. Bizarrely, the system rewarded investing in emerging markets with the biggest debts -- and Argentina was often No. 1 on that list during the 1990s.

Within the financial fraternity, some acknowledge that this behavior was a major contributor to the downfall of a country that prided itself on following free-market tenets. That is because the optimism emanating from Wall Street, combined with the heavy inflow of money, made the Argentine government comfortable issuing more and more bonds, driving its debt to levels that would ultimately prove ruinous.

"The time has come to do our mea culpa," Hans-Joerg Rudloff, chairman of the executive committee at Barclays Capital, said at a conference of bank and brokerage executives in London a few months ago. "Argentina obviously stands as much as Enron" in showing that "things have been done and said by our industry which were realized at the time to be wrong, to be self-serving."

Compounding the financial industry's sins, Rudloff said, were its sales of Argentine bonds to individual investors, mostly in Europe, when the pros balked at buying them. Moreover, in mid-2001, as Argentina was hurtling toward default, Wall Street promoted an expensive and ultimately futile "debt swap" that gave Argentina more time to pay its debts but jacked up the interest cost. The fees on that deal alone totaled nearly $100 million.

Wall Street firms assert that their enthusiasm for backing Argentina's borrowing was motivated by a sincere, if misplaced, optimism about the country's economic strengths. But critics contend that the same forces that fueled the U.S. tech-stock frenzy were at work in Argentina, in effect causing economic globalization to play a cruel trick on the country.

Charles W. Calomiris, a Columbia University economist who was one of the earliest prophets of Argentina's financial doom, wonders why government investigators have not intervened, given the danger that the same fate could befall other countries.

"How come we have one standard for private-sector deals, where everybody is getting all upset about conflicts of interest, and nobody in Washington has raised an eyebrow over the obvious conflicts of interest involving research and underwriting activities by U.S. financial firms in the area of emerging-market sovereign debt?" Calomiris said.


"A Bravo New World." So proclaimed the title page of a report on Argentina and other Latin American markets that Goldman, Sachs & Co. sent to clients in 1996.

The report hailed Argentina for shucking policies that had afflicted the country for decades with stagnation, bouts of hyperinflation and repeated currency devaluations. The government of President Carlos Menem was accelerating reforms launched in the early 1990s aimed at deregulating the economy and turning inefficient state-run enterprises over to the private sector. Particularly important, the report's authors observed, was Argentina's determination to maintain its currency "convertibility" system, which guaranteed that the central bank would exchange pesos for dollars at a fixed rate -- one peso for one dollar. Implemented in 1991, that system was remarkably effective in keeping inflation at bay, imparting a sense of stability among consumers, savers and businesses that had been absent for generations.

"For Argentine citizens and for those investors who were willing to believe in [the government's] promises, the benefits are now becoming apparent," the Goldman report said. The nation's economy, which started to grow robustly in the early 1990s, expanded at an average 5.8 percent rate from 1996 through 1998.

As the report suggested, that success story translated into a compelling sales pitch for the Street.

Seeking to exploit a fevered atmosphere for emerging markets, firms such as Goldman, Morgan Stanley & Co. and Credit Suisse First Boston LLC built their presence in Argentina and neighboring countries by dispatching teams of economists and financial experts, many in their twenties and early thirties. They competed fiercely for "mandates" from governments to be lead managers of bond sales, especially in Argentina, whose government was the single largest emerging-market bond issuer. They found plenty of customers for the bonds in the United States and other wealthy countries among professional investors who managed hundreds of billions of dollars held in mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies and other large institutions.

"Every time we finished a meeting [with institutional investors], the orders would come," said Miguel Kiguel, who then was Argentina's finance secretary, recalling the demand for a $2 billion issue of 20-year bonds, managed in 1997 by J.P. Morgan and Merrill Lynch.

In the emerging-markets world, people "were making money hand over fist in those days," said Stewart Hobart, a recruiter working in the field. According to Hobart and other recruiters, strategists and senior economists at major banks typically earned $350,000 to $900,000 a year, including bonuses, while their bosses, the heads of emerging-markets research, were paid well more than $1 million.

Much was at stake for the firms in their Argentine business. Were it not for Argentina's prodigious bond sales, LatinFinance magazine reported in 1998, many emerging-market investment bankers "would probably have been twiddling their thumbs" that year, because crises in Asia and Russia caused capital flows to dry up to the markets they usually served.

One securities firm, Dresdner Kleinwort Benson, reassured clients who were worried that Argentina would follow countries like Thailand and Indonesia into turmoil. "Argentina has come through the first phase of the Asian crisis with flying colors," the firm said in a June 1998 report, and it was "no coincidence. The economic fundamentals are considerably stronger than three and a half years ago."

Amid the ebullience, however, Argentina was laying the groundwork for its economic destruction.

Early Warning

In meetings with top Argentine policymakers in April 1998 to discuss the country's finances, a senior official of the International Monetary Fund, Teresa Ter-Minassian, sounded the alarm that the country might be headed for an Asian-style meltdown. "The Argentine economy contains a sort of Molotov cocktail," Ter-Minassian was quoted in Argentine media reports as saying.

Many economists' postmortems on the crisis agree: that was when Argentina went wrong, missing a crucial opportunity while the economy was going gangbusters to reduce its vulnerability to crisis.

In particular, the government had to shrink its budget deficit, because its constant borrowing was causing its debt load to increase, from 29 percent of gross domestic product in 1993 to 41 percent of GDP in 1998. Argentina had a special reason to exercise extraordinary prudence: the cherished convertibility system for the peso. If markets began to get jittery about the government's ability to repay its debts, they might well lose confidence in the currency, and overwhelm the system by dumping pesos for dollars.

Argentina's budget policy was "not all that bad" during the 1990s; "it just wasn't terrific at a time when terrific was needed," said Nancy Birdsall, president of the Center for Global Development.

Globalization is supposed to keep problems like Argentina's from occurring. In theory, international financial markets reward sound economic policies by steering capital to countries that practice them. The influence of the capital inflow makes a government even more disciplined, because policymakers know that otherwise investors may yank their money out.

In practice, the gusher of foreign money lulled Argentina's government into complacency, acknowledged Rogelio Frigerio, who was secretary of economic policy in 1998. "If you get the money so easily as we did, it's very tough to tell the politicians, 'Don't spend more, be more prudent,' because the money was there, and they knew it," he said.

Argentina's best chance to put its economy on a sound footing was gone soon thereafter, as supercharged growth gave way to recession in 1999, mostly because of a financial crisis in neighboring Brazil. At that point, a vicious circle emerged: The slump caused tax revenue to fall, which widened the budget deficit, which aroused concern about the government's ability to service its debt, which caused markets to drop, which deepened the recession, and so on.

Argentina was unable to escape the vicious circle, which gradually intensified over three years. At the big Wall Street firms, few realized how dire the country's predicament was -- with one notable exception.

Underplayed Pessimism

Long before Argentina's default, Desmond Lachman, chief emerging market economic strategist at Salomon Smith Barney Inc., saw that the Argentine economy had no way to break out of its slump and would hit the wall one way or another. Many people in the emerging-markets business recall the gloom Lachman conveyed in conversations with clients as recession began to grip Argentina, while analysts at other firms predicted a recovery.

But Lachman's pessimism was not spelled out in reports published by Salomon, a part of Citigroup, which was a major underwriter of Argentine government bonds. Written research reports are important in influencing where capital flows, partly because money managers want to have material in their files to back up their investment decisions.

Officials in Argentina's economy ministry knew that Lachman was describing the country's prospects in very dark terms. They continued to include Salomon among their underwriters anyway, but they told the firm to "make sure you have a variety of views" besides Lachman's, a former Argentine official recalled. Published research on Argentina by other Salomon analysts tended to be relatively sanguine about the country's chances for pulling through, even in the turbulent months of 2001 leading to the default.

Lachman, who left Salomon to become a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, declined to be quoted for this story. Asked why his negative assessment of Argentina wasn't published, Arda Nazerian, a spokeswoman for Citigroup's securities arm, cited Salomon's merger with Citibank in the fall of 1998, which created a firm with an abundance of analysts, enabling Lachman to spend more time privately with big clients. "The expansion of our emerging-markets research team reduced Desmond's responsibilities for writing on individual countries," she said.

Lachman's story is emblematic of Wall Street's reluctance to offend major issuers of securities. "It's a lot of self-censorship," said Federico Thomsen, who until recently was chief economist of ING Barings's office in Buenos Aires. "It's like, if you have something good to say, you say it, but if you have something bad to say, just keep your mouth shut."

The reports that Wall Street firms published on Argentina, to be sure, became much less bullish as the recession deepened in 2000 and early 2001. Analysts increasingly stressed the importance of the government cutting its deficit and reforming labor laws. But in general, the reports predicted that Argentina would muddle through. An example was a report published in October 2000 by J.P. Morgan, the biggest underwriter of Argentine bonds in the 1990s, titled, "Argentina's debt dynamics: Much ado about not so much."

By contrast, the analyst who most publicly warned of Argentina's impending doom was Walter Molano, head of research at BCP Securities, a Connecticut firm that does no underwriting of sovereign bonds.

Such evidence of bias among analysts is misleading, according to some current and former analysts who maintain that their overriding objective has always been to serve investor-clients well by providing the best advice possible. "My incentive is to be able to predict what will happen," said Siobhan Manning, emerging market strategist at Caboto USA. "If I can predict accurately, hopefully I gain credibility, and the firm does, and I'm able to make money."

But others acknowledge that they cannot help being influenced by the fact that their compensation is likely to be greater if their investment banking colleagues win deals to sell bonds. For one thing, success for the investment bankers means the pool of money available for bonuses will be larger, and at some firms, the analysts' bonuses are decided by groups of managers that include investment bankers.

"Your salary will be about one-third of your compensation in a decent year, so your bonus is everything," said Christian Stracke, who covered Latin American economies at Deutsche Bank and other firms in the 1990s and is now with CreditSights, a much smaller outfit specializing in research. "You'll never know what percentage of that bonus came from the recommendation of [investment bankers], but you do know that without the recommendation of [investment bankers], your bonus is just not going to be very big."

Although analysts want to make the right calls, Stracke said, "they're in it for the money. If they were in it to be smart, they'd be professors."

A Perverse Situation

It wasn't just rosy analyst reports that enticed big investors to buy Argentine bonds. Many money managers thought they had to be big holders of the bonds because their jobs depended on it. The word "perverse" is repeatedly used by people in the industry to describe what happened.

Just as in the world of stock market investing, where money managers aim to beat the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index, many professional investors in emerging markets are judged every quarter or so by how well their portfolios fare in comparison to a benchmark. Their job security and annual bonuses have often depended on whether they outperform an index called the Emerging Markets Bond Index-Plus, developed by J.P. Morgan, which tracks the prices of bonds issued by various emerging economies.

During much of the 1990s, Argentina had the heaviest weighting in the index of any nation, peaking at 28.8 percent in 1998 -- not because of its economic size, but simply because its government sold so many bonds.

The index virtually forced big investors to lend vast sums to Argentina even if they feared that the country was likely to default in the long run, several money managers said. Although default would hurt their portfolios, they would still lose less than the index as long as they were a bit "underweight," meaning they held a smaller percentage of Argentine bonds than the index dictated.

They didn't dare be too far underweight. Money managers who shunned Argentine bonds were taking a huge risk, because their portfolios would almost certainly underperform the index in the event Argentine bonds rallied, as happened from time to time.

So at investor gatherings, money managers who were asked their views and investment positions on Argentina would often say "negative" and "underweight," said Mohamed El-Erian, who manages emerging-market bonds at Pimco, the giant West Coast investment firm.

"The dreaded third question would come: 'How much underweight?'" El-Erian said. "They would say, 'It's 22 percent of the index. I can't possibly be more than 5 percent underweight.' So they'd have 17 percent of their money in Argentina."

Indexation survives for lack of a good alternative for measuring money managers' skills, but unhappiness over its flaws is widespread. Everyone knows that the system "can cause credit deterioration" by impelling more lending to borrowers with the most debt, said Michael Pettis, a professor at Columbia University Business School who was a managing director in the fixed income capital markets group at Bear Stearns.

It is like "a bizarre AA program in which you remove booze from the homes of people who are reducing the amount they drink and put it into the homes of people who are drinking more every day," Pettis said. "This is probably not the best way to reduce drunkenness."

Europe Bought In Big

Professional portfolio managers, of course, had a pretty good sense of the dicey game they were playing with Argentine bonds. The same could not be said of some others.

Felicia Migliorini, a divorcee who lives north of Rome, sank her life savings, about $135,000, into Argentine bonds in March 2001. About 400,000 fellow Italians did the same; together with other individuals, mostly in Europe, they now hold about $24 billion in claims on the bankrupt Argentina government.

Migliorini has been forced to put her apartment up for sale because she cannot afford the condominium fees and other expenses. Like thousands of other Italians, she blames her bank, which sold her the bonds. Lawsuits are flying; the banks contend that the purchasers were mostly wealthy, sophisticated people who surely realized what sort of risks they were taking. But Migliorini is outraged. "They told me [the bonds] were good, stable, guaranteed, and that since they were obligations they had to be paid back," she said.

European retail investors like Migliorini were an attractive market for the syndicates selling Argentine bonds. Professional money managers in the United States were often reluctant to buy at the yields the Argentine authorities were willing to pay. So the syndicates tailored a number of their offerings to Europe, in local currencies.

One attraction of the European market was that regulations protecting small investors are substantially less strict than in the United States.

"That's what kept Argentina going," said Tom White, who at the time was employed by Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. as an emerging-market bond manager. "Those poor suckers didn't have a clue as to what they were buying."

For Argentina, "keeping the country going" might sound beneficial. But a different conclusion could be reached as the recession dragged on and the government's debt neared 50 percent of gross domestic product in late 2000. The longer Argentina was kept going with infusions of cash, and the more the country delayed facing unpleasant realities about its plight, the more cataclysmic a crash it would suffer.

At a closed-door meeting at the Argentine Embassy in Washington in October 2000 to discuss the country's finances, Calomiris, the Columbia professor, urged that the government summarily reduce the amount of its debt payments by 20 to 30 percent. The country, he recalled saying, was ensnared in a trap: The markets were demanding increasingly high interest payments on the mountain of debt at rates far in excess of the economy's capacity to grow.

Foreign creditors were bound to conclude sooner or later that the debt was unpayable in full, Calomiris warned, and if Argentina continued trying to honor its obligations it would only build up more vulnerability to complete financial breakdown.

Calomiris's proposal was rejected by the Argentine government and the IMF as too drastic. But in the months that followed, his scenario began to unfold more or less as forecast.

Capital fled the country and interest rates skyrocketed when a political rift erupted in the cabinet of President Fernando de la Rua in November 2000.

The IMF rushed to Argentina's aid with a $14 billion loan, but after a brief rally, the country's markets sank anew. By the spring, buyers of Argentine government bonds were demanding yields as high as 10.5 percentage points above U.S. Treasurys, which meant that interest costs would become even more burdensome for the government and the economy at large.

Wall Street had one more plan to keep Argentina going -- a profitable one, at least from the Street's standpoint.

Debt Swap

Upon being appointed Argentina's economy minister in March 2001, Domingo Cavallo had barely ensconced himself in his office before David Mulford, chairman international of Credit Suisse First Boston, arrived to make a pitch.

Cavallo, the father of Argentina's peso-convertibility system, had a long history of dealings with Mulford, going back to Cavallo's previous term as economy minister from 1991 to 1996. The men got to know each other when Mulford was Treasury undersecretary for international affairs during the first Bush administration, and their relationship deepened when Mulford joined CSFB, which handled the privatization of Argentina's state oil company and became one of the biggest underwriters of Argentine government bonds.

Mulford had an idea for a deal that would dwarf the ones he had done before. He proposed a "debt swap," in which Argentina's bondholders would be given the opportunity to exchange their old bonds for new ones, on a voluntary basis. The purpose was to eliminate a problem that was disturbing the markets -- the large amount of interest and principal payments Argentina was scheduled to make in the years 2001 through 2005. Under the swap, those interest and principal payments would be stretched out so that much more would fall due in the years after 2005. That would give Argentina "breathing space" to restart economic growth, Mulford contended.

Despite the skepticism of some analysts and policymakers, including the IMF's chief economist, who believed the deal would prolong the agony and dig Argentina into a deeper hole, Cavallo agreed to try the swap.

Mulford traveled to the world's financial capitals to pitch the swap, which he described as creating the opportunity for improvement in the economy, the fiscal situation and market sentiment. The deal was "essential to long-term success in restoring Argentine growth," he declared in Buenos Aires. Mulford declined to comment for this article.

The results, announced in June, were proclaimed a resounding success: Bondholders offered to exchange nearly $30 billion worth of bonds, considerably more than had been expected. The seven banks that managed the deal, led by CSFB and Morgan, collected nearly $100 million in fees, an amount they justified by pointing to the 60-plus experts who worked on the complex transactions.

Within weeks of the deal's completion, though, Argentine markets were again in a tailspin and another IMF loan in August provided only a temporary respite.

By late November 2001, deposits were flying out of Argentine banks. The government took the extraordinary measure of slapping controls on withdrawals.

That helped trigger street demonstrations and rioting, which led to the resignations of Cavallo and de la Rua in mid-December. Their successors soon thereafter declared default and freed the peso from its dollar anchor.

Lessons Learned

A year and a half after the crash, Argentina has begun recovering from its depression. Although the economy is still producing considerably less than before the crisis, and unemployment is much higher, growth has picked up in the past several quarters. A few Wall Street bankers are sniffing around again for deals to restructure defaulted debt, but the national government has ruled out hiring any firm that underwrote its bonds during the 1990s.

The brightening outlook in Argentina has helped attract a new inflow of funds from abroad, enough to drive the stock market and the peso sharply higher this year. This time, however, the government has responded with restrictions aimed at limiting the amount of "hot" money coming into the country. The move reflects the view of some in Argentina, notably Roberto Lavagna, the current economy minister, about the lessons that should be learned from the country's economic collapse.

"The lesson is, we must pay attention to bubbles," Lavagna said in a visit to Washington this year. "With stocks, or companies, or countries, all are part of the same phenomenon. Probably Argentina is the best example of a country."

For developing nations, "the worst period is when financial markets have the most liquidity," Lavagna said. "This is when countries make the worst mistakes. That is certainly the case in Argentina."

Special correspondents Brian Byrnes in Buenos Aires, and Sarah Delaney in Rome, contributed to this report.